the hospital. Results show that this methodology can be used to provide risk mitigation measures
INTRODUCTION 26
Latest disasters have shown that large parts of the world are subjected to multiple natural, manmade, 27 and artificial hazards. The rising of global population and the massive economic development in 28 areas prone to disasters have increased the chance of multiple catastrophic incidents, which lead to 29 disruption of buildings and infrastructures. After realizing that multi-hazard cannot be averted, 30 modern societies are trying to enhance their capacity to withstand and to minimize the impact of 31 multi-hazard on community infrastructure and human beings. Therefore, multi-hazard engineering 32 and related mitigation risks are prompting attention in the topic of design and retrofitting of buildings 33 and infrastructures. 34
The concept of multi-hazard is defined as the "implementation of methodologies and approaches 35 aimed at assessing and mapping the potential occurrence of different types of natural hazards in a 36
given area. The employed methods have to take into account the characteristics of the single 37 hazardous events as well as their mutual interactions and interrelations" (Delmonaco et al. 2006) . 38
Multi-hazard design starts with the structural and non-structural analysis for individual hazard. The 39 location, magnitude, and frequency of occurrence of each hazard have to be estimated through a 40 probabilistic approach. Several probabilistic approaches have been proposed for multi-hazard risk 41 assessment. A quantitative risk analysis of industrial facilities in a seismic area was carried out by 42 Fabbrocino et al. (2005) taking properly into account the multi-hazard effects. An oil storage plant 43 with several atmospheric steel tanks containing flammable materials was considered as a case study. 44
The vulnerability of the steel tanks was estimated through a quantitative probabilistic seismic risk 45
analysis. The response of the industrial equipment was expressed in terms of limit states defined in 46 accordance with the post-earthquake damage observations and the consequence analysis was 47 performed. Asprone et al. (2010) assessed the blast damage for a four-story reinforced concrete 48 building in addition to seismic fragility. A possible blast scenario was assumed during the service life 49 of a building located in a seismic zone, and then the probability of progressive collapse was 50 calculated using a Monte Carlo simulation procedure. 51
Recent evaluation of post-disaster effects has led to the implementation of significant changes in the 52 modeling and numerical assessment of multi-hazards. Padgett et al. (2010) evaluated hazard 53 intensities to accurately predict the vulnerability of bridges using a multivariate regression analysis 54 of the data obtained by surveys after Hurricane Katrina. 55
More specifically, when considering multi-hazard, the assessment has to be performed by comparing 56 risks of cascading mechanisms related to the triggered hazard event. For instance, the impact of an 57 earthquake on a gas pipeline may initiate gas leakage, which may likely cause an explosion. There 58 are several examples of sequential hazards initiated by earthquakes which have caused fire such as 59
San Francisco (1906) , Tokyo (1923) , Kobe (1995) , and Northridge (1994) earthquakes (Usmani 60 2008). The risk assessment of structures that are exposed to more than one hazard is determined by 61 adopting the performance-based approach. Bruneau et al. (2006) investigated the performance of 62 steel piers under seismic action. The simulation of large-magnitude earthquakes and the consequent 63 explosions confirmed the capacity of the materials to resist to earthquakes and blast separately, but 64 not a simultaneous combination of the two hazards (Bruneau et al. 2006) . A novel assessment 65 method was suggested by Barbato et al. (2013) to evaluate the individual impacts of the interaction 66 among hurricane wind, flood, windborne debris, and rainfall hazards in the Performance-Based 67
Hurricane Engineering (PBHE) framework. 68
Furthermore, disasters are catastrophic to the socio-economic activities and affected communities 69 (Lindell et al. 2006 ). Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) developed HAZUS-MH 70 (2011) to perform multi-hazard analysis. It is capable of estimating economic, physical and social 71 effects by providing access to the average annualized loss and probabilistic results from the hurricane 72 wind, flood and earthquake models and combining them. 73
The combination of cascading hazards to evaluate the real performance of a structure is among the 74 most difficult tasks due to the intricacy involved in the process. Although the use of current 75 probabilistic approaches is perceived as an important instrument to quantify the total loss, developing 76 a simplified probabilistic methodology is clearly challenging. In this paper, a new approach to 77 estimate the total amount of structural damage caused by series of cascading hazards is proposed. 78 Earthquake, blast, and fire were considered as sequential hazards and numerical analyses were 79 performed to assess the fragility functions for each hazard. The combination of the structural damage 80 for cascading hazards was evaluated according to Bayes' theorem. The conditional probability of 81 exceeding a certain intensity level due to the occurrence of triggered hazard with a given intensity 82 level was estimated by using physical models that take into account the vulnerability of a structural 83 component. The methodology was applied to a steel structure hospital located in California, US. 84
The first section of the paper will provide a detailed description of the proposed methodology, while 85 the second part will illustrate its applicability through a case study building. Lastly, a numerical 86 example of total structural damage estimation is performed. 87
PROPOSED METHODOLOGY 88
The application of the multi-hazard approach can improve the safety of structures and minimize life 89 cycle costs and human losses. In the Performance-Based Earthquake Engineering (PBEE) framework 90 (Porter 2003) , the structural performance is conventionally expressed in terms of probability to 91 exceed a stated performance objective when the structure is subjected to a certain level of hazard as 92 follow: 93
where DV identifies the Decision Variable, DM represents the Damage Measure, EDP is the 95 Engineering Demand Parameter, and IM is the Intensity Measure that characterizes the hazard. 96
The term p(IM) represents the density probability function of exceeding a certain IM for a given 97 hazard. In the case of cascading events, the correlation in terms of total exceedance probability of a 98
given IM (P(IMi≥imi)) has to be estimated through the associated conditional probability (see Fig. 1 ). 99 P(IMi≥imi|IMi-1≥imi-1) represents the conditional probability of exceeding an IM for the i th hazard 100 (IMi≥imi) due to a given IM for the (i-1) th hazard (IMi-1≥imi-1). 101
In a multi-hazard scenario, the effects of different hazards combination (chain effects) have to be 102 considered. The damage caused by the occurrence of a hazard generates a degradation of the 103 Structural Parameters (SP) that influences the response of the structure subjected to the next 104 sequential hazard. The PBEE framework for multiple cascading hazards is shown in Fig. 2 . To 105 consider the multi-hazard cascading effects, Eq. (1) can be rewritten as 106
where IM1 indicates the intensity measure parameter associated with the main hazard (triggered 109 hazard), the index i refers to i th hazard, and n is the total numbers of cascading hazards. 110
Considering a multi-story building, the degradation of their structural characteristics (stiffness, 111 strength, and damping) is evaluated according to FEMA P440A (FEMA 2009) (see Fig. 3 ). 112
Assuming a rigid horizontal diaphragm, the general component of the reduced stiffness matrix is 113 calculated by 114
where kf,jj is the reduced stiffness component, Ef,j is the reduced elastic modulus, and Ij and hj are the 116 inertia and height for the j th story, respectively. The damping matrix is evaluated according to the 117 Rayleigh formulation considering the reduced stiffness matrix. 118
The estimation of the probability of exceeding an IM for a hazard due to a given IM for the previous 119 hazard is provided by using specific physical models. As an example, a steel tank containing 120 flammable materials located in a seismic zone is considered. The probability to have an explosion of 121 the tank due to an earthquake with a given intensity level depends on the ignition mechanism of the 122 fuel content and on the failure modes of the tank. A physical model has to be capable of describing 123 the seismic fragility of the tank by identifying the most probable failure modes and the consequent 124 fuel release mechanism. 125
CASE STUDY 126
The case study considered earthquake, blast, and fire as series of cascading hazards. A five-story 127 steel building, located in Oakland, California, was designed according to the requirements of ASCE to the equivalent lateral force method (ASCE 2010). The W shape were used for beams and columns 137 while hollow structural sections (HSS) were designed for the bracing system (see Fig. 4 and Fig. 5) . 138
The building's design comply with the occupancy category IV allowing the building to serve as a 139 hospital and accordingly an importance factor equals to 1.5 was considered in the seismic design. 140
The special steel moment resisting frame was designed with considering a response modification 141 factor (R) of 8 while the bracing system was designed with a response modification factor (R) of 6 142 considering the special steel concentrically braced frame according to ASCE 7-10 (ASCE 2010). The 143 P-∆ effects from the gravity columns were considered and the effects of large deformations of beam 144 and column elements were accounted for utilizing P-∆ nonlinear geometric transformation. 145 A standby power system was designed for providing an alternative source of electrical power for the 146 building and facilities in case of power outage. This system includes an above ground Liquid 147
Propane Gas (LPG) tank equipped with power sources, transfer equipment, controls, supervisory 148 equipment and accessory which are located outdoor. The tank was designed to provide a total power 149 of 2500 kVA and to maintain full capacity about 8 hours. The fuel capacity of the tank was assumed 150 The sequence of hazards triggered by the earthquake is not known and depends on the localization of 155 the high-risk potential elements inside and/or outside the analyzed structural system as well as their 156 level of damages. As an example, Fig. 8 represents the logical tree of multi-hazard sequence for 157 healthcare facilities. 158
The earthquake occurs and it causes damage to both building elements and external fuel tank. The 159 damaged tank may start fuel leakage and continues for a while in which gas ignites and causes 160 deflagration of the fuel inside the tank. Then, the explosion of the tank could generate an impulsive 161 air pressure load on the building façade which would cause localized damage to structural 162 components. The heat released by the tank explosion may cause the ignition of the inflammable 163 materials inside the buildings. In a short time, the ignition generates flashover and fire propagates 164 through the building compartment. 165
HAZARD ANALYSIS 166
Earthquake 167
The case study building is located in Oakland, California, US (Lat: 37.7792, Long: -122.1620). 168
Three hazard levels: 2%, 10%, and 50% probabilities of exceedance in 100 years were selected, 169
representing Collapse Prevention (CP), Life Safety (LS), and Immediate Occupancy (IO), 170 respectively (FEMA 2000). To better characterize the seismic hazard at the site, two additional sets 171 of records representative of hazard levels at 5% and 20% probabilities of exceedance are also used in 172 the analysis. The mean value of moment magnitude (MW,mean) and epicenter distance (Rmean) with the 173 logarithmic spectral offset at reference period (ε(Tref)) were evaluated according to Boore comparison between the target spectrum and the mean spectrum for HL of 2% and 5% in 100 years 191 is depicted in Fig. 9 . For each HL, the mean spectrum was obtained as an average of the seven 192 groups of spectra. The mean spectrum-compatibility is satisfied into the reference range of period 193 (highlighted in grey in Fig. 9 ). 194
Furthermore, the spectral acceleration at reference period (Sa(Tref)) was considered as seismic IM 195 parameter in the analyses. Table 1 resumes the values of the IM parameters for each HL obtained 196 from the CMS-ε spectra. The maximum value of spectral acceleration denotes a strong seismic action 197 that may occur with a 2% of probability of exceedance in 100 years. 198
Blast 199
After an earthquake, the supply system (fuel tank, electrical components, etc.) may be slightly considering the three parameters as stochastic variables, the total conditional probability of 205 exceeding an IM for blast (IMB≥imB) due to a given IM for earthquake (IME≥imE) is expressed as 206
where PL represents the probability of fuel leakage, PFC is the probability to have maximum fuel 208 concentration and PI defines the probability of ignition. 209
Since the tank is relatively small in size, it is reasonable to assume that the damage occurs in the pipe 210 connected to the tank. According to ATC P-58-2 (FEMA 2012), the probability to have large gas 211 leakage for small diameter piping system (D<2.5 in) is given in terms of a fragility function with 212 accelerations as EDP (μ=1.1g, β=0.5). The probability to have maximum gas concentration was 213 estimated considering the pipe failure relative to the rigid joint connection. A simplified dynamic 214 model was developed to assess the maximum horizontal drift of the pipe. 215
The tank was considered as a rigid body upon shear flexible legs. The tank is fully restrained at the 216 base by the anchor bolts designed according to ASCE 7-10 (ASCE 2010). 217
The dynamic behavior of the tank depends on the Fuel Quantity (FQ) inside the tank. This parameter 218 was considered as a stochastic variable normally distributed and nine different exceedance 219 probabilities were considered as shown in Table 2 . Since the LPG tank has to supply energy in the 220 emergency conditions, its fuel quantity during an earthquake may not be less than a given minimum 221 threshold. In the case study, a normal distribution of the fuel quantity was assumed with a mean 222 value of 70% of the maximum quantity and standard deviation of 10. These parameters were selected 223 to accomplish a reasonable functionality of the supplying tank in case of emergencies. Since the tank 224 was designed to supply energy to the hospital in the case of power outage, the probability to have 225 low fuel volume was assumed close to zero. Furthermore, the exceedance probability to have 100% 226 of fuel quantity was fixed to 1. 227
Maximum fuel concentration (FCmax) is assumed to happen when the shear failure occurs in the 228 vertical pipe. According to this hypothesis and considering the maximum shear stress value on the 229 cross section of the pipe, the failure spectral acceleration (Sa,failure) is calculated by 230
where fu,d and E represent the ultimate stress and elastic modulus of the steel, respectively, De and Di 232 are the external and internal pipe diameter, and Lv is the length of the vertical pipe, and g is the 233 gravity acceleration. 234
The spectral acceleration at the reference period of the tank (Sa(Ttank)) related to each selected ground 235 motion was considered as the first IM parameter (IM1) and fuel quantity as the second IM parameter 236 (IM2). Then, for each IM value, the spectral acceleration at the reference period of the tank was 237 compared with failure spectral acceleration. When Sa(Ttank) is greater than Sa,failure, the failure of the 238 pipe occurs and the probability to have maximum fuel concentration is assumed equal to 1 and 0 239 otherwise. Then, a tridimensional fragility surface was developed by fitting a lognormal distribution 240 of the obtained results. 241
Ignition probability is estimated according to the maximum released fuel quantity. The charts 242 provided by International Association of Oil and Gas Producers (IAOGP 2010) were used to estimate 243 the probabilities of hydrocarbon releases ignition for several scenarios. The total ignition probability 244 is considered as the sum of immediate and delayed ignition. Only delayed ignition probability was 245 considered in the case study since immediate ignition needs sources close to the fuel leakage point. 246
The release of flammable gases from small onshore LPG plant was considered as ignition scenario 247 according to IAOGP (IAOGP 2010) and the related probability function was assumed (see Fig.  248 
10(c)). 249
The probability of gas leakage, maximum gas concentration, and ignition are shown in Fig. 10 . 250
Maximum gas concentration (FCmax) was calculated according to the Bernoulli's principle assuming 251 failure of the pipe (FCmax=29.70 kg/s) and the related probability was derived (see Fig. 10(c) ). 252
Finally, the conditional probability of exceeding an IM for blast (IMB≥imB) due to a given IM for 253 earthquake (IM1=Sa(Ttank)≥im1, IM2=FQ≥im2) is calculated by using Eq. (2) (see Fig. 11 ). 254
The fuel quantity does not have a considerable influence while the spectral acceleration at the period 255 of the tank provides a sensitive contribution especially for values greater than 0.5 g. 256
Fire 257
The probability to have fire inside the building is related to the heat transmission due to the tank 258 with steel studs. Thus, each fire compartment was identified as the volume confined between 267 adjacent columns (see Fig. 12 ) and ceiling. 268
The minimum value of heat flux capable of igniting the common flammable materials in a room was 269 assumed equal to 30 MJ/m 2 (Babrauskas and Krasny 1985) . For each considered fuel quantity, the 270 surfaces of the building façade having a heat flux greater than 30 MJ/m 2 is identified (see Fig. 13 ). 271
The fire may propagate through the opening surfaces located within the heat flux surface for a given 272 fuel quantity (see Fig. 13 ) and the number and localization of the compartments under fire were 273 identified (see Table 3 ). 274
When the calculated heat flux is greater than the considered limit, the estimated conditional 275 probability to have ignition of elements inside the building was assumed equal to 1, and 0 otherwise. 276
The conditional probability of exceeding an IM for fire (IMF≥imF) due to a given IM for blast 277 (IMB=FQ≥imB) was estimated (P(IMF≥imF|IMB≥imB)) by fitting a lognormal distribution of the 278 obtained results (see Fig. 14) . A mean μ=40% and standard deviation β=0.95 were estimated for the 279 lognormal cumulative density probability (see Fig. 14) . 280
281

SRTUCTURAL ANALYSIS 282
Earthquake 283
The time history analyses were performed on a three-dimensional steel structure utilizing SAP2000 284 (type P-M2-M3 with M-χ cylindrical domain) was applied for columns. The plastic hinges for brace 288 elements were modeled as Steel-braces Axial Hinges. 3% of damping ratio was assigned to the 289 frames using Rayleigh damping formulation with control frequency of 1.00 and 2.85 rad/s. The 290 nonlinear dynamic analyses were performed using non-linear direct integration method, taking into 291 account P-Δ effects and applying the horizontal acceleration time histories in the two principal plan 292 directions of the building model. 293
Blast 294
Estimation of blast load parameters was focused in the number of studies during the last decades and 295 several methods were proposed to determine the explosion wave properties. U.S. Army Technical 296
Manual (TM5-1300 1990) is a widely used standard which presents a series of charts to determine 297 the basic parameters of blast loads. Charts provided by TM5-1300 were used in order to establish the 298 blast load parameters required in structural analysis. As a general practice, the magnitude and 299 distribution of the blast load are a function of the quantity of output energy released by detonation, 300 charge weight (W), and the stand-off distance of explosive relative to the particular target (R). W is 301 expressed as an equivalent weight of trinitrotoluene (TNT) and blast wave demands were determined 302 in a function of universal scaled distance parameter (
TNT equivalent charge weight of 303 LPG fuel is given by (Sutton et al. 1975 represents the weight of casing (kg). The spectral accelerations of the tank for each HL were 314 considered as first IM (IM1), while nine different fuel quantities representative of the second IM 315 (IM2) (ranging from 55% to 100%) were assumed for performing blast analyses were considered (see 316 Table 2 ). 317
Detonation of an explosive releases a large-scale of energy in terms of compressed air in a short 318 period of time (blast wave). Blast wave generates an instantaneous rise to the value of pressure (Pso) 319 above ambient pressure (Po). Then blast shock expands with very high velocity outward from the 320 explosion source into the surrounding areas (positive-pressure phase). As the blast wave travels into 321 increasingly larger areas, the energy of blast wave is dissipated and positive incident pressure at the 322 front decays. Within milliseconds of time, the air front pressure may drop below the normal 323 atmospheric pressure over the time period (to) which creates partial vacuums (negative-pressure 324 phase). The negative phase is usually of a longer duration (to-) than the positive phase and its 325 amplitude (Pso -) is less than the ambient atmosphere pressure. When the blast wave encounters 326 structure, reflection increases the overpressure to a maximum pressure (Pr) which is greater than the 327 peak incident pressure (Pso) (see Fig. 15(a) ). 328
The reflected pressure is a function of the incident angle (between the shock wave and the line 329 perpendicular to the target surface) and the incident pressure. The maximum reflected pressure and 330 corresponding total reflected impulse (ir) were calculated through provided charts by TM5-1300. For 331 design purpose, the blast time history overpressure was idealized by rising of an equivalent triangular 332 pulse of maximum reflected pressure at an arrival time (tA) after the explosion (see Fig. 15 The blast load was applied to beams, columns and exterior walls on the exposed structural area on 341 the front face of the explosion. The reflection areas of the building were assumed big enough in order 342 that there is no blast wave diffraction around the structure. Exterior walls were considered as typical 343 concrete masonry wall reinforced with vertical bars. Since the vertical span of the wall is less than 344 the horizontal span, and also the connection between the wall and adjacent columns are typically 345 weak, the most of the wall strength and stiffness is provided by the vertical direction. Hence the wall 346 components were considered as one-way spanning elements that can transfer only the equivalent 347 static reaction load to the adjacent beams. 348
To do blast analysis, each wall was simplified as a Single Degree Of Freedom (SDOF) system. The 349 mass, stiffness and actual force of the wall were transformed into an equivalent system so that the 350 deflection of the concentrated mass is the same as the mid-span of the actual wall (Biggs 1964 ). An 351 elasto-perfectly plastic behavior for the wall was considered taking into account its dynamic 352 characteristics under the high-velocity impacts (TM5-1300). The dynamic responses of the mid-span 353 of the wall, considering the plastic hinge development (yield rotation capacity), were determined. (DIF) in order to take into account the effects of high rapid load environment compared to static 363 loading conditions (TM5-1300 1990). Since the blast load duration is very short compared to the 364 fundamental natural period of the structure, the structural damping effects were not considered in the 365 analyses. Transmission of the ground shock induced by the explosion to the foundation of the 366 structure was not considered in this study. Finally, nonlinear time history analyses were carried. In 367 the cases of the loss of the load-bearing capacity of key structural components, the progressive 368 collapse analyses were performed and the dynamic effects of removal of the failed elements were 369 evaluated using time history analyses. 370
Fire 371
After ignition of inflammable materials inside the compartment, flashover occurs causing an increase 372 in temperature. Design-basis fire standards are based on the evaluation of post-flashover time-373 temperature relationships (fire curve) for the compartment. Naturally, the fire curve depends on the 374 quantity of combustible materials (total calorific value), the velocity of combustion, and the 375 ventilation conditions. The first two parameters affect the total heat flux generated within the 376 compartment (qf). According to Euro Code 1 (EC1, 2002) , the specific fire load is given in terms of 377 mean value and standard deviation of a normally distributed function for different building 378 categories. For hospitals, the mean specific fire load of 230 MJ/m 2 and the standard deviation of 69 379 are suggested. In the study case, the specific heat flux of the compartment was selected as first IM 380 (IM1) and eight different exceedance probabilities were considered as shown in Table 4 . 381
The fuel quantity inside the tank was assumed as second IM parameter (IM2). 
The first expression describes the heating phase, while the second one is referred to the cooling 388 phase. The ventilation conditions are considered by means of the opening factor F 389
where Av is the total surface of vertical openings, H is the height of openings, 390
and Ac is the area of the compartment. Two vertical openings with 1.50 m×2.00 m were assumed for 391 each compartment (see Fig. 12 ) and the opening factor of 0.07 was calculated. 392
The constant C is associated with the type of burned materials and it is assumed equal to 1 for light 393 materials and 0 for heavy ones. The top of the curve is described by peak time (tpeak) and peak 394 temperature (Tpeak). These two parameters define the fire severity inside the compartment. These Table 5 , the slope of the heating curve (Tpeak/tpeak) decreases with the increasing of the generated heat 420 flux into the compartment. 421
Degradation of the physical and mechanical characteristics of the materials and the actions due to the 422 fire were evaluated. According to Fourier's equation, the thermal distribution depends on the net 423 transmitted heat flux (qf,n) in the time for a given fire scenario. Assuming all the structural elements 424 as homogeneous and isotropic, the Fourier's problem can be integrated into the volume of the 425 element and rewritten in the discrete form as ( EC3 2005) 426
where ΔT(i) defines the i th increment of uniform temperature in the element cross section and Am/V is 428 the section factor given by the ratio between the area of the element exposed to fire (Am) and its total 429 volume (V). Density (ρ) and specific heat (c) are referred to the material composing structural 430 element while Δt is the time step in which the increase of temperature occurs (Δt<5s). The fire 431 protection system effect was neglected in the fire analysis. The current fire codes do not address the 432 compound effects of hazards in a sequential manner. In fact, the damage to structural elements due to 433 earthquake and blast, causes partial loss of fire protection (e.g. cracking of fireproof cladding, 434 peeling of fireproof painting, etc.). Since in this case study, the fire load was applied on the structure 435 damaged by sequential earthquake and blast, all the measures for fireproofing are deteriorated. The 436 estimation of fire protection loss percentage is out of this study, then the total loss of fireproof 437 system was considered as the worst case. 438
The coefficient ksh takes into account the "shadow effects" that is responsible for a non-uniform 439 thermal transversal distribution. In order to consider a pseudo-uniform transversal temperature 440 distribution, the ksh coefficient was considered according to the real fire exposure. Parameter ksh=0.7 441 was assumed for beams (fire exposure on three sides) and
of the element that was assumed as bin section and (Am/V) is the real section factor of the column. 444
The fire exposure for the column was supposed for one side of the web and for both flanges. Three 445 different section of beams and columns have been identified for the compartment. Table 6  446 summarizes the uniform temperature on the steel cross sections of the compartment at tpeak time for 447 each heat flux value where the sections W12x136 and W14x109 identify the columns and the section 448
W21x44 is related to the beams inside the compartments. 
DAMAGE ANALYSIS 460
Earthquake 461 A common approach is to correlate the performance of structural elements to one or more EDPs 462 based on peak inter-story drifts. Peak inter-story drifts are capable of providing information about 463 the damage state of the elements. According to ATC P-58 (FEMA 2012), four Earthquake Damage 464
States (DSE) (slight, moderate, extensive, and complete) have been identified for the steel building 465 depending on the transient drift ratio. The associated fragility curves are provided for both horizontal 466 directions using the four DSE (see Fig. 16 ). 467
Blast 468
In blast analyses, the evaluation of the structural building performance based on inter-story drifts 469 limits the investigation to maximum local damage. The blast causes a damaged localized on the 470 structural components depending on the distance to the blast source. In the case of intense blast load, 471 a partial collapse may occur causing a redistribution of the actions in the slightly damaged 472 components. Thus, the estimation of the damage on a building has to take into account the global 473 behavior of the structure. In order to accurately assess the global response of a building under blast 474 load, the loss of horizontal stiffness was assumed as EDP. The evaluation of the structural global 475 response requires the maximum lateral displacements shape of the building due to the blast and the 476 total induced elastic action. In the case study, the response of the structure in Y direction (see Table 7 resumes the horizontal stiffness reduction for each selected fuel quantity level 483 derived from the performed progressive collapse analyses. The lateral stiffness reduction was 484 calculated for each selected earthquake scenario considering the chain effects. Thus, the degradation 485 of the structural parameters was evaluated and the blast load was applied on the structure with 486 modified mechanical characteristics. The first column of Table 7 represents the five different HLs for 487 earthquake while the first row identifies the nine HLs selected for the fuel quantity. 488
The yield drift for the braced system was calculated according to ATC P-58 (FEMA 2012) and the 489 maximum drift threshold was assumed for four different damage states. The stiffness reduction limits 490 were calculated assuming an elasto-perfectly plastic global behavior of the steel frame (see Table 7 ). 491
According to the estimated stiffness reduction values for each damage state, the associated 492 exceedance probability (P(DSB≥dsB)) surfaces were evaluated (see Fig. 17 ). 493 The first damage state gives information about the maximum flexural capacity of the beam. The 499 threshold vertical deflection (vb) for this damage state was assumed equal to the deflection causing 500 an uncontrolled vertical displacement (Gernay et al. 2016 ). The second damage state is related to the 501 maximum drift of the column (δc) under multiple stresses due to compression and bending moment, 502 taking into account the P-Δ effects. The maximum limit for the drift was assumed coincident with the 503 horizontal displacement that produces uncontrolled unstable displacement (Gernay et al. 2016) . 504
Several analyses were performed considering the different fuel quantity and heat ratio as HLs. The 505 degradation of the structural parameters was evaluated and the fire load was applied on the structure. 506
For each analysis, the probability to have irreversible damage to the structural elements was assumed 507 equal to 1 if the response parameter is greater than the associated limit and 0 otherwise. 508
The probability of exceeding certain damage state due to the fire hazard (P(DSF≥dsF)) was developed 509 fitting lognormal distribution to the obtained data (see Fig. 18 ). 510
NUMERICAL EXAMPLE 511
The total probability of exceeding a given damage state was derived according to Eq.(2). In a 512 cascading multi-hazard scenario, the probability of exceeding a given damage state has to be 513 calculated considering the conditional probability of exceeding a certain intensity level due to the 514 occurrence of the previous hazard. For the case study, earthquake-blast-fire was considered as 515 cascading hazards. According to the numerical analyses performed and considering a complete 516 damage to the columns of the building as damage state, the probabilities of exceeding the selected 517 level of damage was estimated for the three hazards. 518
The spectral acceleration at the period of the structure, fuel quantity inside the tank, spectral 519 acceleration at the period of the tank, and heat flux generated in the compartment were assumed as 520 IM parameters. A numerical example was carried out with reference to the five different HL for the 521 earthquake, 80% of the full capacity of the tank and heat flux equal to the average value. Table 9  522 shows exceedance damage probability values for the case study building and the conditional 523 probability of exceeding an IM for the one hazard due to a given IM for the previous hazard. The 524 complete damage on the columns was selected as damage state and then the associated exceedance 525 damage probability (P(DS>ds)) was estimated. 526
It is clear that the probability to have blast after the earthquake is correlated to the size of the tank. In 527 the case study, a low conditional probability of exceeding an IM for the blast due to a given IM for 528 the earthquake was associated with the value of maximum gas concentration. But, for the cases of 529 farm tanks, the conditional probability value may be considerable. 530
CONCLUDING REMARKS 531
Recent experiences have shown that buildings and infrastructures are significantly vulnerable to 532 multi-hazard effects. The combination of cascading hazards is essential to evaluate the real 533 performance of a structure and the respective economic losses. This study presented a new approach 534 to assessing the conditional probability of exceeding a certain intensity level due to the occurrence of 535 the previous hazard, estimating the exceedance damage probability and taking into account the 536 interdependency between different hazards. The main novelty of this research is the estimation of 537 exceedance damage probability for a given damage state due to earthquake, blast and fire hazard by 538 considering the physical models. The method can be considered as an alternative to the Monte Carlo 539 simulations, thus it reduces the computational time to perform the analyses, but it requires accurate 540 calibration of the physical parameters which plays a key role in reducing the epistemic uncertainty of 541 the model. In addition, the degradation of the structural parameters was taken into account for 542 correctly assessing the performance of a structure subjected to cascading hazards. 543
The application of the proposed cascading multi-hazard approach can be used for both improving the 544 structural safety and reducing the building life cycle costs to enhance the resilience of the structure. Note: PFQ is the fuel quantity exceedance probability. C4  C5  C6  C13  C14  C15   C4  C5  C6  C13  C14  C15   C4  C5  C6  C13  C14  C15   C4  C5  C6  C13  C14  C15   C4  C5  C6  C13  C14  C15   C4  C5  C6  C13  C14  C15  Compartment  height ID   H1 H1 H1 H1  H1  H2   H1  H2   H1  H2 H1 H2 H1 H2 Note: PFQ is the fuel quantity exceedance probability. 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 Note: PVR,E is the exceedance probability in 100 years for earthquake hazard and Pqf is the compartmental heat flux exceedance probability. PVR,E is the exceedance probability in 100 years for earthquake hazard.
